[PATCH 3.12 064/142] ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in nl_fib_input()

[Jiri Slaby]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

[ Upstream commit c64c0b3cac4c5b8cb093727d2c19743ea3965c0b ]

Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized
field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl

It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit
wrong :

User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide
at sendmsg() time a too small buffer.

Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
index 3d3966bf3df6..4a30de61bec1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
@@ -965,7 +965,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
-	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+	if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) ||
+	    skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
 	    nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn))
 		return;
 
-- 
2.12.2