Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] MIPS: set stack/data protection as non-executable

From: Kees Cook
Date: Fri Dec 05 2014 - 13:51:22 EST


On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 9:28 AM, David Daney <ddaney.cavm@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 12/02/2014 05:58 PM, Leonid Yegoshin wrote:
>>
>> This is a last step of 3 patches which shift FPU emulation out of
>> stack into protected area. So, it disables a default executable stack.
>>
>> Additionally, it sets a default data area non-executable protection.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
>
> NAK!
>
> Some programs require an executable stack, this patch will break them.

Have you tested this?

> You can only select a non-executable stack in response to PT_GNU_STACK
> program headers in the ELF file of the executable program.

This is already handled by fs/binfmt_elf.c. It does the parsing of the
PT_GNU_STACK needs, and sets up the stack flags appropriately. All the
change to VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS does is make sure that EXSTACK_DEFAULT
now means no VM_EXEC by default. If PT_GNU_STACK requires it, it gets
added back in.

-Kees

>
> David Daney
>
>
>
>> ---
>> arch/mips/include/asm/page.h | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h
>> index 3be81803595d..d49ba81cb4ed 100644
>> --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h
>> +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h
>> @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ extern int __virt_addr_valid(const volatile void
>> *kaddr);
>> #define virt_addr_valid(kaddr)
>> \
>> __virt_addr_valid((const volatile void *) (kaddr))
>>
>> -#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
>> +#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | \
>> VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
>>
>> #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>



--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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