[PATCH 3.10 065/123] ext4: check EA value offset when loading

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Nov 11 2014 - 20:53:00 EST


3.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit a0626e75954078cfacddb00a4545dde821170bc5 upstream.

When loading extended attributes, check each entry's value offset to
make sure it doesn't collide with the entries.

Without this check it is easy to crash the kernel by mounting a
malicious FS containing a file with an EA wherein e_value_offs = 0 and
e_value_size > 0 and then deleting the EA, which corrupts the name
list.

(See the f_ea_value_crash test's FS image in e2fsprogs for an example.)

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -189,14 +189,28 @@ ext4_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, ch
}

static int
-ext4_xattr_check_names(struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry, void *end)
+ext4_xattr_check_names(struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry, void *end,
+ void *value_start)
{
- while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
- struct ext4_xattr_entry *next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
+ struct ext4_xattr_entry *e = entry;
+
+ while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(e)) {
+ struct ext4_xattr_entry *next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(e);
if ((void *)next >= end)
return -EIO;
- entry = next;
+ e = next;
}
+
+ while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
+ if (entry->e_value_size != 0 &&
+ (value_start + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) <
+ (void *)e + sizeof(__u32) ||
+ value_start + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs) +
+ le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size) > end))
+ return -EIO;
+ entry = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry);
+ }
+
return 0;
}

@@ -213,7 +227,8 @@ ext4_xattr_check_block(struct inode *ino
return -EIO;
if (!ext4_xattr_block_csum_verify(inode, bh->b_blocknr, BHDR(bh)))
return -EIO;
- error = ext4_xattr_check_names(BFIRST(bh), bh->b_data + bh->b_size);
+ error = ext4_xattr_check_names(BFIRST(bh), bh->b_data + bh->b_size,
+ bh->b_data);
if (!error)
set_buffer_verified(bh);
return error;
@@ -329,7 +344,7 @@ ext4_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode
header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode);
entry = IFIRST(header);
end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size;
- error = ext4_xattr_check_names(entry, end);
+ error = ext4_xattr_check_names(entry, end, entry);
if (error)
goto cleanup;
error = ext4_xattr_find_entry(&entry, name_index, name,
@@ -457,7 +472,7 @@ ext4_xattr_ibody_list(struct dentry *den
raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode);
end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size;
- error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), end);
+ error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), end, IFIRST(header));
if (error)
goto cleanup;
error = ext4_xattr_list_entries(dentry, IFIRST(header),
@@ -972,7 +987,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *
is->s.here = is->s.first;
is->s.end = (void *)raw_inode + EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size;
if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_XATTR)) {
- error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), is->s.end);
+ error = ext4_xattr_check_names(IFIRST(header), is->s.end,
+ IFIRST(header));
if (error)
return error;
/* Find the named attribute. */


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/