Re: [PATCH v3 2/7] shm: add sealing API

[David Herrmann]

Hi Hugh

On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Hugh Dickins <hughd@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, 13 Jun 2014, David Herrmann wrote:
>
>> If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
>> guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
>>   - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
>>   - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
>>   - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
>>
>> If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
>> for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
>> for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
>> often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
>> use-cases:
>>   1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
>>      graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
>>      read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
>>      scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
>>      the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
>>      cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
>>   2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
>>      bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
>>      assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
>>      want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
>>      source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
>>      copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
>>      local copy.
>>
>> While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
>> ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
>> use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
>> to denial of service attacks.
>>
>> This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
>> specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.
>> Unlike locks, seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you
>> verified a specific set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can
>> perform the blocked operations on this file, anymore.
>>
>> An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
>>   - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
>>             in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
>>   - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
>>           in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
>>   - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
>>            are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
>>            write().
>>   - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
>>           This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
>>           can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
>>           don't want.
>>
>> The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
>> without any trust-relationship:
>>   1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
>>      SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
>>      allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
>>      Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
>>   2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
>>      SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
>>      process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
>>      Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
>>      peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
>>      process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
>>
>> The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
>>   F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
>>                can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
>>                sealing.
>>   F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
>>                access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
>>                Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
>>                there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
>>                Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
>>                The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
>>                on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
>>
>> The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
>> files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
>> work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
>> support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
>> file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
>> use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Looks pretty good to me, minor comments below.
>
>> ---
>>  fs/fcntl.c                 |   5 ++
>>  include/linux/shmem_fs.h   |  17 ++++
>>  include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h |  15 ++++
>>  mm/shmem.c                 | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  4 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
>> index 72c82f6..22d1c3d 100644
>> --- a/fs/fcntl.c
>> +++ b/fs/fcntl.c
>> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>>  #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
>>  #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
>>  #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>> +#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/poll.h>
>>  #include <asm/siginfo.h>
>> @@ -336,6 +337,10 @@ static long do_fcntl(int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
>>       case F_GETPIPE_SZ:
>>               err = pipe_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
>>               break;
>> +     case F_ADD_SEALS:
>> +     case F_GET_SEALS:
>> +             err = shmem_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
>> +             break;
>>       default:
>>               break;
>>       }
>> diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> index 4d1771c..50777b5 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
>> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
>>  #ifndef __SHMEM_FS_H
>>  #define __SHMEM_FS_H
>>
>> +#include <linux/file.h>
>>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>>  #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
>>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>> @@ -11,6 +12,7 @@
>>
>>  struct shmem_inode_info {
>>       spinlock_t              lock;
>> +     unsigned int            seals;          /* shmem seals */
>>       unsigned long           flags;
>>       unsigned long           alloced;        /* data pages alloced to file */
>>       union {
>> @@ -65,4 +67,19 @@ static inline struct page *shmem_read_mapping_page(
>>                                       mapping_gfp_mask(mapping));
>>  }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
>> +
>> +extern int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals);
>> +extern int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file);
>> +extern long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>> +static inline long shmem_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
>> +{
>> +     return -EINVAL;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  #endif
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> index 074b886..beed138 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h
>> @@ -28,6 +28,21 @@
>>  #define F_GETPIPE_SZ (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 8)
>>
>>  /*
>> + * Set/Get seals
>> + */
>> +#define F_ADD_SEALS  (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
>> +#define F_GET_SEALS  (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Types of seals
>> + */
>> +#define F_SEAL_SEAL  0x0001  /* prevent further seals from being set */
>> +#define F_SEAL_SHRINK        0x0002  /* prevent file from shrinking */
>> +#define F_SEAL_GROW  0x0004  /* prevent file from growing */
>> +#define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008  /* prevent writes */
>> +/* (1U << 31) is reserved for signed error codes */
>> +
>> +/*
>>   * Types of directory notifications that may be requested.
>>   */
>>  #define DN_ACCESS    0x00000001      /* File accessed */
>> diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
>> index f484c27..1438b3e 100644
>> --- a/mm/shmem.c
>> +++ b/mm/shmem.c
>> @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
>>  #include <linux/highmem.h>
>>  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
>>  #include <linux/magic.h>
>> +#include <linux/fcntl.h>
>>
>>  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>>  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
>> @@ -531,16 +532,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_truncate_range);
>>  static int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
>>  {
>>       struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
>> +     struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> +     loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
>> +     loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
>>       int error;
>>
>>       error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
>>       if (error)
>>               return error;
>>
>> -     if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
>> -             loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
>> -             loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;
>> +     /* protected by i_mutex */
>> +     if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
>> +             if ((newsize < oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)) ||
>> +                 (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW)))
>> +                     return -EPERM;
>> +     }
>
> Not important but...
> I'd have thought all that was better inside the S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
> (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) block.  Less unnecessary change above, and
> more efficient for non-size attrs.  You cannot seal anything but a regular
> file anyway, right?

You're right. Fixed.

>>
>> +     if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
>>               if (newsize != oldsize) {
>>                       i_size_write(inode, newsize);
>>                       inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
>> @@ -1315,6 +1323,7 @@ static struct inode *shmem_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, const struct inode
>>               info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>>               memset(info, 0, (char *)inode - (char *)info);
>>               spin_lock_init(&info->lock);
>> +             info->seals = F_SEAL_SEAL;
>>               info->flags = flags & VM_NORESERVE;
>>               INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->swaplist);
>>               simple_xattrs_init(&info->xattrs);
>> @@ -1374,7 +1383,15 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
>>  {
>>       int ret;
>>       struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
>> +     struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>>       pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>> +
>> +     /* i_mutex is held by caller */
>> +     if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
>> +             return -EPERM;
>> +     if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size)
>> +             return -EPERM;
>
> I think this is your only addition which comes in a hot path.
> Mel has been shaving nanoseconds off this path recently: you're not
> introducing any atomic ops here, good, but I wonder if it would make any
> measurable difference to include this pair of tests inside a single
> "if (unlikely(info->seals)) {".  Maybe not, but it wouldn't hurt.

It doesn't hurt adding the unlikely() protection, either. Fixed.

>> +
>>       ret = shmem_getpage(inode, index, pagep, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
>>       if (ret == 0 && *pagep)
>>               init_page_accessed(*pagep);
>> @@ -1715,11 +1732,166 @@ static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
>>       return offset;
>>  }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Setting SEAL_WRITE requires us to verify there's no pending writer. However,
>> + * via get_user_pages(), drivers might have some pending I/O without any active
>> + * user-space mappings (eg., direct-IO, AIO). Therefore, we look at all pages
>> + * and see whether it has an elevated ref-count. If so, we abort.
>> + * The caller must guarantee that no new user will acquire writable references
>> + * to those pages to avoid races.
>> + */
>> +static int shmem_test_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
>> +{
>> +     struct radix_tree_iter iter;
>> +     void **slot;
>> +     pgoff_t start;
>> +     struct page *page;
>> +     int error;
>> +
>> +     /* flush additional refs in lru_add early */
>> +     lru_add_drain_all();
>> +
>> +     error = 0;
>> +     start = 0;
>> +     rcu_read_lock();
>> +
>> +restart:
>> +     radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &mapping->page_tree, &iter, start) {
>> +             page = radix_tree_deref_slot(slot);
>> +             if (!page || radix_tree_exception(page)) {
>> +                     if (radix_tree_deref_retry(page))
>> +                             goto restart;
>> +             } else if (page_count(page) - page_mapcount(page) > 1) {
>> +                     error = -EBUSY;
>> +                     break;
>> +             }
>> +
>> +             if (need_resched()) {
>> +                     cond_resched_rcu();
>> +                     start = iter.index + 1;
>> +                     goto restart;
>> +             }
>> +     }
>> +     rcu_read_unlock();
>> +
>> +     return error;
>> +}
>
> Please leave shmem_test_for_pins() (and the comment above it)
> out of this particular patch.
>
> The implementation here satisfies none of us, make it harder to
> figure out the patch improving it later, and distracts from the basic
> sealing interface and functionality that you introduce in this patch.
>
> A brief comment on the issue instead - "But what if a page of the
> object is pinned for pending I/O?  See later patch" - maybe, but on the
> whole I think it's better to raise and settle the issue in later patch.

Removed and replaced by a dummy:

int shmem_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
{
        return 0;
}

>> +
>> +#define F_ALL_SEALS (F_SEAL_SEAL | \
>> +                  F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
>> +                  F_SEAL_GROW | \
>> +                  F_SEAL_WRITE)
>> +
>> +int shmem_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
>> +{
>> +     struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
>> +     struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
>
> struct inode *inode = file_inode(file), and forget about dentry?

Fixed.

>> +     struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>> +     int error;
>> +
>> +     /*
>> +      * SEALING
>> +      * Sealing allows multiple parties to share a shmem-file but restrict
>> +      * access to a specific subset of file operations. Seals can only be
>> +      * added, but never removed. This way, mutually untrusted parties can
>> +      * share common memory regions with a well-defined policy. A malicious
>> +      * peer can thus never perform unwanted operations on a shared object.
>> +      *
>> +      * Seals are only supported on special shmem-files and always affect
>> +      * the whole underlying inode. Once a seal is set, it may prevent some
>> +      * kinds of access to the file. Currently, the following seals are
>> +      * defined:
>> +      *   SEAL_SEAL: Prevent further seals from being set on this file
>> +      *   SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
>> +      *   SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
>> +      *   SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
>> +      *
>> +      * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
>> +      * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
>> +      * only adds a given set of seals to the file, it never touches
>> +      * existing seals. Furthermore, the "setting seals"-operation can be
>> +      * sealed itself, which basically prevents any further seal from being
>> +      * added.
>> +      *
>> +      * Semantics of sealing are only defined on volatile files. Only
>> +      * anonymous shmem files support sealing. More importantly, seals are
>> +      * never written to disk. Therefore, there's no plan to support it on
>> +      * other file types.
>> +      */
>> +
>> +     if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
>> +             return -EINVAL;
>> +     if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>> +             return -EINVAL;
>
> I would expect -EBADF there (like when you write to read-only fd).
> Though I was okay with the -EPERM you had the previous version.

Nice catch. Replaced by EPERM again.

>> +     if (seals & ~(unsigned int)F_ALL_SEALS)
>> +             return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +     mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
>> +
>> +     if (info->seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) {
>
> I notice this is inconsistent with F_SEAL_WRITE just below:
> we're allowed to SEAL_WRITE what's already SEAL_WRITEd,
> but not to SEAL_SEAL what's already SEAL_SEALed.
> Oh, never mind, I can see that makes some sense.
>
>> +             error = -EPERM;
>> +             goto unlock;
>> +     }
>> +
>> +     if ((seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) && !(info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)) {
>> +             error = mapping_deny_writable(file->f_mapping);
>> +             if (error)
>
> Which would be -EBUSY, yes, that seems okay.
>
> And with your atomic i_mmap_writable changes in 1/7, and the i_mutex
> here, the locking is now solid, and accomplished simply: nice.
>
>> +                     goto unlock;
>> +
>> +             error = shmem_test_for_pins(file->f_mapping);
>> +             if (error) {
>> +                     mapping_allow_writable(file->f_mapping);
>> +                     goto unlock;
>> +             }
>
> Right, although I ask you to remove shmem_test_for_pins() from this
> patch, I can see that you might want to include a "return 0" stub for
> shmem_wait_for_pins() in this patch, just so that this can appear here
> now, and we consider the non-atomicity of it.  Yes, I agree this is
> how it should proceed: first deny, then re-allow if waiting fails.

I replaced shmem_test_for_pins() with shmem_wait_for_pins() and kept
the code as is.

>> +     }
>> +
>> +     info->seals |= seals;
>> +     error = 0;
>> +
>> +unlock:
>> +     mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
>> +     return error;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_add_seals);
>> +
>> +int shmem_get_seals(struct file *file)
>> +{
>> +     if (file->f_op != &shmem_file_operations)
>> +             return -EINVAL;
>
> That's fine, though it is worth considering whether return 0
> might be preferable.  No, I suppose this is easier, fits with
> shmem_fcntl() just returning -EINVAL when !TMPFS or !SHMEM.

Agreed.

>> +
>> +     return SHMEM_I(file_inode(file))->seals & F_ALL_SEALS;
>
> & F_ALL_SEALS?  Okay, that may be some kind of future proofing that you
> have in mind; but it may just be a leftover from when you were using bit
> 31 for internal use.

Nice catch. It's indeed a left-over. I removed it.

>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shmem_get_seals);
>> +
>> +long shmem_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>> +{
>> +     long error;
>> +
>> +     switch (cmd) {
>> +     case F_ADD_SEALS:
>> +             /* disallow upper 32bit */
>> +             if (arg >> 32)
>> +                     return -EINVAL;
>
> That is worth checking, but gives
> mm/shmem.c:1948:3: warning: right shift count >= width of type
> on a 32-bit build.  I expect there's an accepted way to do it;
> I've used "arg > UINT_MAX" myself in some places.

The zero-test bot already reported this and I fixed it with a u64
cast. Your UINT_MAX test is definitely nicer so I changed it again.

Thanks!
David

>> +
>> +             error = shmem_add_seals(file, arg);
>> +             break;
>> +     case F_GET_SEALS:
>> +             error = shmem_get_seals(file);
>> +             break;
>> +     default:
>> +             error = -EINVAL;
>> +             break;
>> +     }
>> +
>> +     return error;
>> +}
>> +
>>  static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>>                                                        loff_t len)
>>  {
>>       struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>>       struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(inode->i_sb);
>> +     struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode);
>>       struct shmem_falloc shmem_falloc;
>>       pgoff_t start, index, end;
>>       int error;
>> @@ -1731,6 +1903,12 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>>               loff_t unmap_start = round_up(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
>>               loff_t unmap_end = round_down(offset + len, PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
>>
>> +             /* protected by i_mutex */
>> +             if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) {
>> +                     error = -EPERM;
>> +                     goto out;
>> +             }
>> +
>>               if ((u64)unmap_end > (u64)unmap_start)
>>                       unmap_mapping_range(mapping, unmap_start,
>>                                           1 + unmap_end - unmap_start, 0);
>> @@ -1745,6 +1923,11 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
>>       if (error)
>>               goto out;
>>
>> +     if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && offset + len > inode->i_size) {
>> +             error = -EPERM;
>> +             goto out;
>> +     }
>> +
>>       start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>>       end = (offset + len + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
>>       /* Try to avoid a swapstorm if len is impossible to satisfy */
>> --
>> 2.0.0
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/