Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create()

[Pavel Machek]

On Thu 2014-04-10 13:37:26, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 12:14:27PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>
> >> This is the second time in a week that someone has asked for a way to
> >> have a struct file (or struct inode or whatever) that can't be reopened
> >> through /proc/pid/fd.  This should be quite easy to implement as a
> >> separate feature.
> >
> > What I suggested on a different thread was to add the following new
> > file descriptor flags, to join FD_CLOEXEC, which would be maniuplated
> > using the F_GETFD and F_SETFD fcntl commands:
> >
> > FD_NOPROCFS     disallow being able to open the inode via /proc/<pid>/fd
> >
> > FD_NOPASSFD     disallow being able to pass the fd via a unix domain socket
> >
> > FD_LOCKFLAGS    if this bit is set, disallow any further changes of FD_CLOEXEC,
> >                 FD_NOPROCFS, FD_NOPASSFD, and FD_LOCKFLAGS flags.
> >
> > Regardless of what else we might need to meet the use case for the
> > proposed File Sealing API, I think this is a useful feature that could
> > be used in many other contexts besides just the proposed
> > memfd_create() use case.
> 
> It occurs to me that, before going nuts with these kinds of flags, it
> may pay to just try to fix the /proc/self/fd issue for real -- we
> could just make open("/proc/self/fd/3", O_RDWR) fail if fd 3 is
> read-only.  That may be enough for the file sealing thing.

Yes please.

Current behaviour is very unexpected, and unexpected behaviour in
security area is normally called "security hole".

									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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