Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection

[David Rientjes]

On Thu, 12 Dec 2013, vegard.nossum@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:

> diff --git a/security/exploit.c b/security/exploit.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a732613
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/exploit.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/exploit.h>
> +#include <linux/printk.h>
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +
> +void _exploit(const char *id)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * This function needs to be super defensive/conservative, since
> +	 * userspace can easily get to it from several different contexts.
> +	 * We don't want it to become an attack vector in itself!
> +	 *
> +	 * We can assume that we're in process context, but spinlocks may
> +	 * be held, etc.

Not task_lock(current), though.

> +	 */
> +
> +	struct task_struct *task = current;
> +	pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(task);
> +	uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
> +	char comm[sizeof(task->comm)];
> +
> +	get_task_comm(comm, task);
> +
> +	pr_warn_ratelimited("warning: possible %s exploit attempt by pid=%u uid=%u comm=%s\n",
> +		id, pid, uid, comm);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(_exploit);
--
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