Re: lgetxattr()/getxattr() return different values on a file labelledwith selinux disabled

From: Stephen Smalley
Date: Fri Mar 15 2013 - 13:07:22 EST


On 03/15/2013 11:24 AM, Thomas COUDRAY wrote:
2013/3/15 Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
f is truly a regular file and not a symlink pointing to a regular file?

f is a truly regular file.

before_t and after_t are both defined in the policy?

Only before_t was defined in the policy.

If not defined in policy, then kernel should remap to unlabeled sid context.

When I define after_t in the policy, both commands return the same
label (after_t).
But I wouldn't expect this to make a difference in the output of both
commands (as the only visible difference is lgetxattr() vs getxattr())

getxattr security.* results are supplied by the security module rather than the filesystem to allow the value to be canonicalized. But this should happen the same for lgetxattr and getxattr; those should only differ if the file is a symlink.

before_t and after_t are not type aliases of each other?

They are not.

What are the credentials (capabilities and SELinux security
context/permissions) of the process running the ls and getfattr commands?

It has unconfined_u:unconfined_r:before_t label with before_t type.
Same as the file f.
The process has full SELinux rights on both command and file.

Did it run as root? Does it have :capability2 mac_override permission?

Any relevant messages from SELinux in dmesg output?

No avc warnings in dmesg and audit.log. All looks good.

What about SELinux: messages? e.g. SELinux: Context ... is not valid (left unmapped).


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