Re: [PATCH c/r -mm] c/r: prctl: Simplify PR_SET_MM on mm::code/data assignment

From: Kees Cook
Date: Tue Apr 17 2012 - 15:53:30 EST


On Tue, Apr 17, 2012 at 12:49 PM, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 17, 2012 at 11:19:16PM +0400, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> ...
>> > Since this is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, and mmap_min_addr is CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
>> > how about a lower-bounds check against mmap_min_addr? (We're already
>> > doing the TASK_SIZE upper check, so this additional sanity checking
>> > seems reasonable to me.)
>>
>> I think this is good idea, thanks Kees. I'll check it out.
>
> Updated and tested version is below.
>
>        Cyrill
> ---
> From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [PATCH] c/r: prctl: Simplify PR_SET_MM on mm::code/data assignment v2
>
> The mm::start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data members
> are set during startup of executable file and are not changed
> after.
>
> But the program itself might map new executable or/and data areas in
> time so the original values written into mm fields mentioned above
> might not have correspond VMA area at all, thus if one try to
> use this prctl codes without underlied VMA, the error will be
> returned.
>
> Drop this requirement. This shrinks the code and eliminates
> redundant calls to vma_flags_mismatch. The worst thing one can
> do (if say to write some bad values here) -- the weird results
> will be shown in /proc/$pid/statm or in /proc/pid/stat.
>
> Still, assignement of data on stack (such as command line and
> environment variables) requires the underlied VMA to exist.
>
> v2:
>  Also make sure the address being set is greater than mmap_min_addr.
>  Suggested by Kees Cook.
>
> Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/