Re: ANN: libseccomp

[Henrique de Moraes Holschuh]

On Fri, 13 Apr 2012, Paul Moore wrote:
> the seccomp filter into the kernel.  By default libseccomp attempts to set 
> NO_NEW_PRIVS but does not fail if prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) returns with an error; 

Isn't that dangerous in non-obvious ways, as in it can actually
cause/activate/enable/open security issues on priviledged processes that
don't expect whatever filtering seccomp will subject them to?

Maybe it would be best if libseccomp were to (by default) bomb out with
an error if prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) fails?  Defaults are important, as
they're what people _who don't know any better_ are likely to use.

-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh
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