Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering usingBPF

[Alan Cox]

> Thus, execv will not be a "special" case here. Seccomp either allows it
> or not. But also add a command to tell seccomp that this task will not
> be allowed to do anything privileged.

A setuid binary is not necessarily priviledged - indeed a root -> user
transition via setuid is pretty much the reverse.

It's a change of user context. Things like ptrace and file permissions
basically mean you can't build a barrier between stuff running as the
same uid to a great extent except with heavy restricting, but saying
"you can't become someone else" is very useful.

Alan
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