Re: chroot(2) and bind mounts as non-root

[Alan Cox]

On Wed, 07 Dec 2011 12:34:28 -0800
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On 12/07/2011 09:54 AM, Colin Walters wrote:
> > 
> > The historical reason one can't call chroot(2) as non-root is because of
> > setuid binaries (hard link a setuid binary into chroot of your choice
> > with trojaned libc.so).
> 
> No.  The historical reason is that it lets anyone escape a chroot jail:

Beg to differ

Nobody ever considered chroot a jail except a certain brand of
urban-legend-programming people. Indeed chroot has never been a jail
except in the 'open prison' security sense of it.

The big problem with chroot was abusing setuid binaries - particularly
things like uucp and /bin/mail.


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