Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Checkpoint/Restore: Show in proc IDs of objectsthat can be shared between tasks

From: Kyle Moffett
Date: Fri Nov 18 2011 - 20:09:34 EST


On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 18:46, Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 05:10:37PM -0500, Kyle Moffett wrote:
>> The #1 rule of one-time pads is never use it for more than one thing,
>> and you use it here for every object in the system.
>
> The new version is using different poison for different types of
> objects.

Even still, if you use a one-time pad (IE: XOR with a random data
value) to obscure more than exactly 1 object total, ever, all of its
security properties are null and void.


>> If you actually want to be able to compare uniqueness without exposing
>> anything vulnerable to various kinds of guessing, you should generate
>> a random 64-bit value for each class of object and then use a proper
>> cryptographic hash function on it:
>> Â crypto_hash(concat(object_ptr, random_value))
>>
>> Even given the best possible practical attacks against SHA1 or MD5
>> today both still provides more than enough security to prevent someone
>> from guessing "object_ptr" in less than an absurd amount of time.
>
> So, per-type poison + crypto hash, it is then.

Yes. I haven't thought through whether or not you would ever care
about a system giving out the same number for two different kinds of
object. The only possible vulnerability I can think of would be if
the kernel had a use-after-free bug... You could allocate and free a
bunch of the vulnerable objects and use this data-structure-ID system
to find an allocated data-structure of a different type which matches
up with one of the used-after-freed ones. Then in theory you could
compromise something, I suppose.

Sort of an off-the-wall scenario, I will admit.

The per-type random value is certainly a safe bet and should have zero
actual impact on performance. Good luck!

Cheers,
Kyle Moffett

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