[PATCH] proc: fix races of /proc/PID/{fd/,fdinfo/,fdinfo/*}

[Vasiliy Kulikov]

fd* files are restricted to the task's owner, but keeping opened procfs
file descriptors makes it possible to violate the permission model.
Keeping fdinfo/* may disclosure current position and flags, keeping
fdinfo/ and fd/ may disclosure number of opened files.

Used existing (un)lock_trace functions to deal with the race.

CC: Stable Tree <stable@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Hopefully, I'll propose more simple way to guard private procfs files
 soon, without these "scattered" ptrace checks.

 fs/proc/base.c |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 08e3ecc..b0477c3 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1906,37 +1906,46 @@ static int proc_fd_info(struct inode *inode, struct path *path, char *info)
 	struct files_struct *files = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
 	int fd = proc_fd(inode);
+	int rc;
 
-	if (task) {
-		files = get_files_struct(task);
-		put_task_struct(task);
-	}
-	if (files) {
-		/*
-		 * We are not taking a ref to the file structure, so we must
-		 * hold ->file_lock.
-		 */
-		spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
-		file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
-		if (file) {
-			if (path) {
-				*path = file->f_path;
-				path_get(&file->f_path);
-			}
-			if (info)
-				snprintf(info, PROC_FDINFO_MAX,
-					 "pos:\t%lli\n"
-					 "flags:\t0%o\n",
-					 (long long) file->f_pos,
-					 file->f_flags);
-			spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
-			put_files_struct(files);
-			return 0;
+	if (!task)
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	rc = lock_trace(task);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_task;
+
+	files = get_files_struct(task);
+	if (files == NULL)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	/*
+	 * We are not taking a ref to the file structure, so we must
+	 * hold ->file_lock.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+	file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
+	if (file) {
+		if (path) {
+			*path = file->f_path;
+			path_get(&file->f_path);
 		}
-		spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
-		put_files_struct(files);
+		if (info)
+			snprintf(info, PROC_FDINFO_MAX,
+					"pos:\t%lli\n"
+					"flags:\t0%o\n",
+					(long long) file->f_pos,
+					file->f_flags);
+		rc = 0;
+	} else {
+		rc = -ENOENT;
 	}
-	return -ENOENT;
+	spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+	put_files_struct(files);
+out_unlock:
+	unlock_trace(task);
+out_task:
+	put_task_struct(task);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
@@ -2057,13 +2066,20 @@ static struct dentry *proc_lookupfd_common(struct inode *dir,
 	struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(dir);
 	unsigned fd = name_to_int(dentry);
 	struct dentry *result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+	int rc;
 
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
 	if (fd == ~0U)
 		goto out;
 
+	rc = lock_trace(task);
+	result = ERR_PTR(rc);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
 	result = instantiate(dir, dentry, task, &fd);
+	unlock_trace(task);
 out:
 	put_task_struct(task);
 out_no_task:
@@ -2083,23 +2099,28 @@ static int proc_readfd_common(struct file * filp, void * dirent,
 	retval = -ENOENT;
 	if (!p)
 		goto out_no_task;
+
+	retval = lock_trace(p);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
+
 	retval = 0;
 
 	fd = filp->f_pos;
 	switch (fd) {
 		case 0:
 			if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, 0, inode->i_ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
-				goto out;
+				goto out_unlock;
 			filp->f_pos++;
 		case 1:
 			ino = parent_ino(dentry);
 			if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
-				goto out;
+				goto out_unlock;
 			filp->f_pos++;
 		default:
 			files = get_files_struct(p);
 			if (!files)
-				goto out;
+				goto out_unlock;
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			for (fd = filp->f_pos-2;
 			     fd < files_fdtable(files)->max_fds;
@@ -2123,6 +2144,9 @@ static int proc_readfd_common(struct file * filp, void * dirent,
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			put_files_struct(files);
 	}
+
+out_unlock:
+	unlock_trace(p);
 out:
 	put_task_struct(p);
 out_no_task:
-- 
1.7.0.4
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