Re: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400

[Pekka Enberg]

On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 10:37 PM, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This patch makes these techniques more difficult by making it hard to
> know whether the last attacker-allocated object resides before a free or
> allocated object.  Especially with vulnerabilities that only allow one
> attempt at exploitation before recovery is needed to avoid trashing too
> much heap state and causing a crash, this could go a long way.  I'd
> still argue in favor of removing the ability to know how many objects
> are used in a given slab, since randomizing objects doesn't help if you
> know every object is allocated.

So if the attacker knows every object is allocated, how does that help
if we're randomizing the initial freelist?
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