Re: Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions - 221af7f87b97431e3ee21ce4b0e77d5411cf1549

From: Michal Simek
Date: Tue Feb 02 2010 - 14:54:24 EST


Linus Torvalds wrote:

On Tue, 2 Feb 2010, Michal Simek wrote:
Would it be possible to cc me or send that patches to linux-next? I am doing
every day tests and report results on my site. I would be able to catch up
bugs earlier.

Normally, that would happen, but this patch got applied early _literally_ because I wanted it to hit -rc6 rather than wait any longer. So it had only a day or two of discussion, and probably just a few hours from the final version.

ok. I just wanted to be sure.


That said, I think I may have found the cause.

Peter: look at setup_new_exec(), and realize that it got moved _down_ to after all the personality setting. So far, so good, that was the intention, but look at what it does:

current->flags &= ~PF_RANDOMIZE;

and look at how fs/binfmt_elf.c does it not just after the personality setting, but also after

if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;

so it looks like you may have moved it down too much.

I think you did that because you wanted to do that

arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);

in setup_new_exec(). Which makes total sense, but it all means that the whole preparatory patch did way more than my initial one (which put setup_new_exec() right after flush_old_exec())

In fact, it looks like PF_RANDOMIZE never gets set with the new code, but I didn't check if it might not happen somewhere else.

But while I doubt that clearing PF_RANDOMIZE will break anything, the movement also affects other thigns. Lookie here:

if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))
current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;

also happens before setup_new_exec(), and then setup_new_exec() does

current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;

where that per_clear mask may be PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID. Which contains READ_IMPLIES_EXEC.

So we now always clear READ_IMPLIES_EXEC for setuid applications.

Anyway, I'm not sure this is it, but that's two examples of something that did change unintentionally.

Michael, mind trying this (UNTESTED!) patch?

Just Michal. :-) No worries about.

It makes conceptual sense,
and moves some more of the flushing of the old process state up to "flush_old_exec()" rather than doing it late in "setup_new_exec()".

yes, your patch works. I tested it on QEMU and on real hw and I can't see any visible problem. I will do more test tomorrow.

Thanks,
Michal


(I suspect we should also move the signal/fd flushing there, but I doubt it matters)

Linus

---
fs/exec.c | 10 +++++-----
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 675c3f4..0790a10 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -961,6 +961,11 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
goto out;
bprm->mm = NULL; /* We're using it now */
+
+ current->flags &= ~PF_RANDOMIZE;
+ flush_thread();
+ current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
+
return 0;
out:
@@ -997,9 +1002,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
tcomm[i] = '\0';
set_task_comm(current, tcomm);
- current->flags &= ~PF_RANDOMIZE;
- flush_thread();
-
/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
* depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
* some architectures like powerpc
@@ -1015,8 +1017,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
}
- current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
-
/*
* Flush performance counters when crossing a
* security domain:


--
Michal Simek, Ing. (M.Eng)
PetaLogix - Linux Solutions for a Reconfigurable World
w: www.petalogix.com p: +61-7-30090663,+42-0-721842854 f: +61-7-30090663
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