Re: drop SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES?

[Andrew G. Morgan]

On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 11:33 AM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wednesday 18 November 2009 01:36:20 pm Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 9:49 AM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On Wednesday 18 November 2009 11:40:13 am Andrew G. Morgan wrote:
>> >> >> But back to detecting the capability version number...if I pass 0 as
>> >> >> the version in the header, why can't the kernel just say oh you want
>> >> >> the preferred version number, stuff it in the header, and return the
>> >> >> syscall with success and not EINVAL?
>> >>
>> >> This is so a library can understand that it doesn't understand the
>> >> current ABI.
>> >
>> > If user space is passing a NULL for the cap_user_data_t argument, user
>> > space has a pretty good idea that its not expecting actual capabilities
>> > to be filled in. My basic point is that there is no way to "correctly"
>> > use the capabilities API to determine what the preferred version is.
>>
>> But older kernels didn't do that.
>
> True, but now we have the problem.
>
>
>> >> The intention is for it to fail safe and not blunder on doing
>> >> "security" related operations with an imperfect idea of the current
>> >> kernel interface.
>> >>
>> >> This is how libcap figures out it can work with the hosting kernel:
>> >
>> > capget(0x20080522, 0, NULL)             = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)
>>
>> I'm not sure what this is supposed to do. This system call takes two
>> arguments and none of them work as your above snippet suggests.
>
> This is from running "strace /usr/sbin/getcap libcap.h". I think strace is
> splitting arg 1 into its 2 elements within the structure for display purposes.
> You can strace it yourself and see. :)
>
>
>> SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t,
>>  dataptr) 165 {
>>  166         int ret = 0;
>>  167         pid_t pid;
>>  168         unsigned tocopy;
>>  169         kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
>>  170
>>  171         ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
>>  172         if (ret != 0)
>>  173                 return ret;
>>
>> ie., two arguments, both of which are pointers. dataptr is not touched
>> if you supply incorrect magic... The return at line 173 is taken if
>> header is explored and does not contain the correct magic (ie.
>> Invalid) - which it overwrites with the kernel-preferred value in the
>> header, and returns EINVAL...
>
> OK, this is the right place to make a fix. Something along the lines of:
>
> @@ -169,8 +169,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_
>        kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
>
>        ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
> -       if (ret != 0)
> +       if (ret != 0) {
> +               if (ret == -EINVAL && dataptr == NULL)
> +                       return 0;
>                return ret;
> +       }
>
>        if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
>                return -EFAULT;
>
>
>> I don't see an EFAULT problem here.
>
> It comes when get_user fails above.

So, how are you expecting to get the prevailing kernel's cap-version
(magic) from the kernel if not via the header object? If you supply a
NULL for the header, what is sys_capget supposed to use to communicate
the value back to user space?

Cheers

Andrew

>
> -Steve
>
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