[RFC v3][PATCH 2/2] intel_txt: Intel(R) TXT and tboot kernel support
From: Joseph Cihula
Date: Fri May 08 2009 - 00:50:00 EST
Linux support for Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology.
Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 187 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 154 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 14 +
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 6
arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/acpi/acpica/hwsleep.c | 33 ++++
drivers/pci/dmar.c | 6
drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c | 26 +++
init/main.c | 3
kernel/cpu.c | 6
security/Kconfig | 22 ++
16 files changed, 764 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@xxxxxxxxx>
---
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ struct efi_info {
struct boot_params {
struct screen_info screen_info; /* 0x000 */
struct apm_bios_info apm_bios_info; /* 0x040 */
- __u8 _pad2[12]; /* 0x054 */
+ __u8 _pad2[4]; /* 0x054 */
+ __u64 tboot_shared_addr; /* 0x058 */
struct ist_info ist_info; /* 0x060 */
__u8 _pad3[16]; /* 0x070 */
__u8 hd0_info[16]; /* obsolete! */ /* 0x080 */
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
FIX_WP_TEST,
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT
+ FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE,
+#endif
__end_of_fixed_addresses
};
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * tboot.h: shared data structure with tboot and kernel and functions
+ * used by kernel for runtime support of Intel(R) Trusted
+ * Execution Technology
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2009, Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
+ * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
+ * more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
+ * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ * 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_TBOOT_H
+#define _ASM_TBOOT_H
+
+#include <acpi/acpi.h>
+
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT 0
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_S5 1
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_S4 2
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_S3 3
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT 4
+#define TB_SHUTDOWN_WFS 5
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT
+
+struct tboot_uuid {
+ u32 data1;
+ u16 data2;
+ u16 data3;
+ u16 data4;
+ u8 data5[6];
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+/* used to communicate between tboot and the launched kernel */
+
+#define TB_KEY_SIZE 64 /* 512 bits */
+
+#define MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS 32
+struct tboot_mac_region {
+ u64 start; /* must be 64 byte -aligned */
+ u32 size; /* must be 64 byte -granular */
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+/* GAS - Generic Address Structure (ACPI 2.0+) */
+struct tboot_acpi_generic_address {
+ u8 space_id;
+ u8 bit_width;
+ u8 bit_offset;
+ u8 access_width;
+ u64 address;
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+/* combines Sx info from FADT and FACS tables per ACPI 2.0+ spec
+ (http://www.acpi.info/) */
+struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info {
+ struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_cnt_blk;
+ struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_cnt_blk;
+ struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_evt_blk;
+ struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_evt_blk;
+ u16 pm1a_cnt_val;
+ u16 pm1b_cnt_val;
+ u64 wakeup_vector;
+ u32 vector_width;
+ u64 kernel_s3_resume_vector;
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+struct tboot_shared {
+ /* version 3+ fields: */
+ struct tboot_uuid uuid; /* TBOOT_SHARED_UUID */
+ u32 version; /* Version number: 5 is current */
+ u32 log_addr; /* physical addr of tb_log_t log */
+ u32 shutdown_entry; /* entry point for tboot shutdown */
+ u32 shutdown_type; /* type of shutdown (TB_SHUTDOWN_*) */
+ struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info
+ acpi_sinfo; /* where kernel put acpi sleep info in Sx */
+ u32 tboot_base; /* starting addr for tboot */
+ u32 tboot_size; /* size of tboot */
+ u8 num_mac_regions; /* number mem regions to MAC on S3 */
+ /* contig regions memory to MAC on S3 */
+ struct tboot_mac_region mac_regions[MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS];
+ /* version 4+ fields: */
+ /* populated by tboot; will be encrypted */
+ u8 s3_key[TB_KEY_SIZE];
+ /* version 5+ fields: */
+ u8 reserved_align[3]; /* used to 4byte-align num_in_wfs */
+ u32 num_in_wfs; /* number of processors in wait-for-SIPI */
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+/* UUID for tboot_shared data struct to facilitate matching */
+/* {663C8DFF-E8B3-4b82-AABF-19EA4D057A08} */
+#define TBOOT_SHARED_UUID \
+ ((struct tboot_uuid){ 0x663c8dff, 0xe8b3, 0x4b82, 0xaabf, \
+ { 0x19, 0xea, 0x4d, 0x5, 0x7a, 0x8 } })
+
+extern struct tboot_shared *tboot_shared;
+
+static inline int tboot_in_measured_env(void)
+{
+ return tboot_shared != NULL;
+}
+
+extern void tboot_probe(void);
+extern void tboot_create_trampoline(void);
+extern void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type);
+extern void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state);
+extern void tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps);
+extern struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_INTEL_TXT */
+
+static inline int tboot_in_measured_env(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void tboot_probe(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void tboot_create_trampoline(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps)
+{
+}
+
+static inline struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif /* !CONFIG_INTEL_TXT */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_TBOOT_H */
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_DS) += ds.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_32) += tls.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) += tls.o
obj-y += step.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TXT) += tboot.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o
obj-y += cpu/
obj-y += acpi/
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
# include <asm/iommu.h>
#endif
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
+
/*
* Power off function, if any
*/
@@ -443,6 +445,8 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_res
if (reboot_emergency)
emergency_vmx_disable_all();
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT);
+
/* Tell the BIOS if we want cold or warm reboot */
*((unsigned short *)__va(0x472)) = reboot_mode;
@@ -508,11 +512,13 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_res
void native_machine_shutdown(void)
{
- /* Stop the cpus and apics */
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-
/* The boot cpu is always logical cpu 0 */
int reboot_cpu_id = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* Stop the cpus and apics */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* See if there has been given a command line override */
@@ -569,6 +575,8 @@ static void native_machine_halt(void)
/* stop other cpus and apics */
machine_shutdown();
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
+
/* stop this cpu */
stop_this_cpu(NULL);
}
@@ -580,6 +588,8 @@ static void native_machine_power_off(voi
machine_shutdown();
pm_power_off();
}
+ /* a fallback in case there is no PM info available */
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_HALT);
}
struct machine_ops machine_ops = {
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct boot_params __initdata boot_param
struct boot_params boot_params;
#endif
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
+
/*
* Machine setup..
*/
@@ -939,6 +941,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
paravirt_pagetable_setup_done(swapper_pg_dir);
paravirt_post_allocator_init();
+ tboot_probe();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
map_vsyscall();
#endif
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
#include <asm/vmi.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
@@ -1313,7 +1314,10 @@ void play_dead_common(void)
void native_play_dead(void)
{
play_dead_common();
- wbinvd_halt();
+ if (tboot_in_measured_env())
+ tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_WFS);
+ else
+ wbinvd_halt();
}
#else /* ... !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c 2009-05-07 10:05:04.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/*
+ * tboot.c: main implementation of helper functions used by kernel for
+ * runtime support of Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2009, Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
+ * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
+ * more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
+ * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ * 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/pfn.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/e820.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
+
+/* Global pointer to shared data; NULL means no measured launch. */
+struct tboot_shared *tboot_shared __read_mostly;
+
+void __init tboot_probe(void)
+{
+ /* Look for valid page-aligned address for shared page. */
+ if (boot_params.tboot_shared_addr == 0)
+ return;
+ /* also verify that it is mapped as we expect it before calling
+ set_fixmap(), to reduce chance of garbage value causing crash */
+ if (!e820_any_mapped(boot_params.tboot_shared_addr,
+ boot_params.tboot_shared_addr, E820_UNUSABLE)) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: non-0 tboot_shared_addr but it is not of type E820_UNUSABLE\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* only a natively booted kernel should be using TXT */
+ if (paravirt_enabled()) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: non-0 tboot_shared_addr but pv_ops is enabled\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Map and check for tboot UUID. */
+ set_fixmap(FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE, boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);
+ tboot_shared = (struct tboot_shared *)
+ fix_to_virt(FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE);
+ if (memcmp(&TBOOT_SHARED_UUID, &tboot_shared->uuid,
+ sizeof(struct tboot_uuid))) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: tboot_shared at 0x%lx is invalid\n",
+ (unsigned long)boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);
+ tboot_shared = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tboot_shared->version < 5) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: tboot_shared version is invalid: %u\n",
+ tboot_shared->version);
+ tboot_shared = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TXT: found shared page at phys addr 0x%lx:\n",
+ (unsigned long)boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT: version: %d\n", tboot_shared->version);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT: log_addr: 0x%08x\n", tboot_shared->log_addr);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT: shutdown_entry: 0x%x\n",
+ tboot_shared->shutdown_entry);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT: tboot_base: 0x%08x\n",
+ tboot_shared->tboot_base);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT: tboot_size: 0x%x\n",
+ tboot_shared->tboot_size);
+}
+
+static pgd_t *tboot_pg_dir;
+static struct mm_struct tboot_mm = INIT_MM(tboot_mm);
+
+static inline void switch_to_tboot_pt(void)
+{
+ write_cr3(virt_to_phys(tboot_pg_dir));
+}
+
+static int map_page_for_tboot(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
+ pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+ pud_t *pud;
+ pmd_t *pmd;
+ pte_t *pte;
+
+ pgd = pgd_offset(&tboot_mm, vaddr);
+ pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
+ if (!pud)
+ return -1;
+ pmd = pmd_alloc(&tboot_mm, pud, vaddr);
+ if (!pmd)
+ return -1;
+ pte = pte_alloc_map(&tboot_mm, pmd, vaddr);
+ if (!pte)
+ return -1;
+ set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
+ pte_unmap(pte);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int map_pages_for_tboot(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long start_pfn,
+ unsigned long nr)
+{
+ /* Reuse the original kernel mapping */
+ tboot_pg_dir = pgd_alloc(&tboot_mm);
+ if (!tboot_pg_dir)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (; nr > 0; nr--, vaddr += PAGE_SIZE, start_pfn++) {
+ if (map_page_for_tboot(vaddr, start_pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC))
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void tboot_create_trampoline(void)
+{
+ u32 map_base, map_size;
+
+ if (!tboot_in_measured_env())
+ return;
+
+ /* Create identity map for tboot shutdown code. */
+ map_base = PFN_DOWN(tboot_shared->tboot_base);
+ map_size = PFN_UP(tboot_shared->tboot_size);
+ if (map_pages_for_tboot(map_base << PAGE_SHIFT, map_base,
+ map_size))
+ panic(KERN_ERR "TXT: Error mapping tboot pages (mfns) @ 0x%x, 0x%x\n", map_base, map_size);
+}
+
+#include "acpi/realmode/wakeup.h"
+#include <asm/trampoline.h>
+
+void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type)
+{
+ if (!tboot_in_measured_env())
+ return;
+
+ /* if we're being called before the 1:1 mapping is set up then just
+ return and let the normal shutdown happen; this should only be
+ due to very early panic() */
+ if (!tboot_pg_dir)
+ return;
+
+ local_irq_disable();
+
+ /* if this is S3 then set regions to MAC */
+ if (shutdown_type == TB_SHUTDOWN_S3) {
+ tboot_shared->num_mac_regions = 3;
+ /* S3 resume code */
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[0].start =
+ PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(acpi_wakeup_address));
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[0].size =
+ PFN_UP(WAKEUP_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ /* AP trampoline code */
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[1].start =
+ PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(trampoline_base)));
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[1].size =
+ PFN_UP(TRAMPOLINE_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ /* kernel code + data + bss */
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[2].start =
+ PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text)));
+ tboot_shared->mac_regions[2].size =
+ PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(virt_to_phys(&_end))) -
+ PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text)));
+ }
+
+ tboot_shared->shutdown_type = shutdown_type;
+
+ switch_to_tboot_pt();
+
+ ((void(*)(void))(unsigned long)tboot_shared->shutdown_entry)();
+
+ /* should not reach here */
+ while (1)
+ halt();
+}
+
+void tboot_sleep(u8 sleep_state)
+{
+ static u32 acpi_shutdown_map[ACPI_S_STATE_COUNT] = {
+ /* S0,1,2: */ -1, -1, -1,
+ /* S3: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S3,
+ /* S4: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S4,
+ /* S5: */ TB_SHUTDOWN_S5 };
+
+ if (sleep_state >= ACPI_S_STATE_COUNT ||
+ acpi_shutdown_map[sleep_state] == -1) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: unsupported sleep state 0x%x\n",
+ sleep_state);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tboot_shutdown(acpi_shutdown_map[sleep_state]);
+}
+
+void tboot_wait_for_aps(int num_aps)
+{
+ if (!tboot_in_measured_env())
+ return;
+
+ while (atomic_read((atomic_t *)&tboot_shared->num_in_wfs) != num_aps)
+ cpu_relax();
+}
+
+/*
+ * TXT configuration registers (offsets from TXT_{PUB, PRIV}_CONFIG_REGS_BASE)
+ */
+
+#define TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE 0xfed30000
+#define TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE 0xfed20000
+
+/* # pages for each config regs space - used by fixmap */
+#define NR_TXT_CONFIG_PAGES ((TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE - \
+ TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+/* offsets from pub/priv config space */
+#define TXTCR_HEAP_BASE 0x0300
+#define TXTCR_HEAP_SIZE 0x0308
+
+#define SHA1_SIZE 20
+struct sha1_hash {
+ u8 hash[SHA1_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct sinit_mle_data {
+ u32 version; /* currently 6 */
+ struct sha1_hash bios_acm_id;
+ u32 edx_senter_flags;
+ u64 mseg_valid;
+ struct sha1_hash sinit_hash;
+ struct sha1_hash mle_hash;
+ struct sha1_hash stm_hash;
+ struct sha1_hash lcp_policy_hash;
+ u32 lcp_policy_control;
+ u32 rlp_wakeup_addr;
+ u32 reserved;
+ u32 num_mdrs;
+ u32 mdrs_off;
+ u32 num_vtd_dmars;
+ u32 vtd_dmars_off;
+} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
+
+struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table(void)
+{
+ void *heap_base, *heap_ptr, *config;
+ struct acpi_table_header *dmar_table;
+
+ /* ACPI tables may not be DMA protected by tboot, so use DMAR copy */
+ /* SINIT saved in SinitMleData in TXT heap (which is DMA protected) */
+
+ /* map config space in order to get heap addr */
+ config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, NR_TXT_CONFIG_PAGES *
+ PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (config == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* now map TXT heap */
+ heap_base = ioremap(*(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_BASE),
+ *(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_SIZE));
+ iounmap(config);
+ if (heap_base == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* walk heap to SinitMleData */
+ /* skip BiosData */
+ heap_ptr = heap_base + *(u64 *)heap_base;
+ /* skip OsMleData */
+ heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr;
+ /* skip OsSinitData */
+ heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr;
+ /* now points to SinitMleDataSize; set to SinitMleData */
+ heap_ptr += sizeof(u64);
+ /* get addr of DMAR table */
+ dmar_table = (struct acpi_table_header *)(heap_ptr +
+ ((struct sinit_mle_data *)heap_ptr)->vtd_dmars_off -
+ sizeof(u64));
+
+ /* don't unmap heap because dmar.c needs access to this */
+
+ return dmar_table;
+}
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/Documentation/intel_txt.txt linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/Documentation/intel_txt.txt
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/Documentation/intel_txt.txt 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/Documentation/intel_txt.txt 2009-05-07 08:31:37.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+Intel(R) TXT Overview:
+=====================
+
+Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology
+(Intel(R) TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building
+blocks for creating trusted platforms.
+
+Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).
+
+Intel TXT in Brief:
+o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
+o Data protection in case of improper shutdown
+o Measurement and verification of launched environment
+
+Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro
+systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38,
+Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and
+mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets.
+
+For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
+This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has
+been updated for the new released platforms.
+
+Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few years, some
+of which are:
+ LinuxTAG 2008:
+ http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag/details.html?talkid=110
+ TRUST2008:
+ http://www.trust2008.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf
+ IDF 2008, Shanghai:
+ http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/aep/PROS003/index.html
+ IDFs 2006, 2007 (I'm not sure if/where they are online)
+
+Trusted Boot Project Overview:
+=============================
+
+Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre- kernel/VMM module that uses Intel
+TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM.
+
+It is hosted on SourceForge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot. The
+mercurial source repo is available at http://www.bughost.org/repos.hg/tboot.hg.
+
+Tboot currently supports launching Xen (open source VMM/hypervisor w/ TXT
+support since v3.2), and now Linux kernels.
+
+
+Value Proposition for Linux or "Why should you care?"
+=====================================================
+
+While there are many products and technologies that attempt to measure or
+protect the integrity of a running kernel, they all assume the kernel is
+"good" to begin with. The Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and Linux
+Integrity Module interface are examples of such solutions.
+
+To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a static root of
+trust must be used. This bases trust in BIOS starting at system reset and
+requires measurement of all code executed between system reset through the
+completion of the kernel boot as well as data objects used by that code. In
+the case of a Linux kernel, this means all of BIOS, any option ROMs, the
+bootloader and the boot config. In practice, this is a lot of code/data, much
+of which is subject to change from boot to boot (e.g. changing NICs may change
+option ROMs). Without reference hashes, these measurement changes are
+difficult to assess or confirm as benign. This process also does not provide
+DMA protection, memory configuration/alias checks and locks, crash protection,
+or policy support.
+
+By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides, many of
+these issues can be mitigated. Specifically: many pre-launch components can
+be removed from the trust chain, DMA protection is provided to all launched
+components, a large number of platform configuration checks are performed and
+values locked, protection is provided for any data in the event of an improper
+shutdown, and there is support for policy-based execution/verification. This
+provides a more stable measurement and a higher assurance of system
+configuration and initial state than would be otherwise possible. Since the
+tboot project is open source, source code for almost all parts of the trust
+chain is available (excepting SMM and Intel-provided firmware).
+
+How Does it Work?
+=================
+
+o Tboot is an executable that is launched by the bootloader as the "kernel"
+ (the binary the bootloader executes).
+o It performs all of the work necessary to determine if the platform supports
+ Intel TXT and, if so, executes the GETSEC[SENTER] processor instruction
+ that initiates the dynamic root of trust.
+ - If tboot determines that the system does not support Intel TXT or is not
+ configured correctly (e.g. the SINIT AC Module was incorrect), it will
+ directly launch the kernel with no changes to any state.
+ - Tboot will output various information about its progress to the terminal,
+ serial port, and/or an in-memory log; the output locations can be
+ configured with a command line switch.
+o The GETSEC[SENTER] instruction will return control to tboot and tboot then
+ verifies certain aspects of the environment (e.g. TPM NV lock, e820 table
+ does not have invalid entries, etc.).
+o It will wake the APs from the special sleep state the GETSEC[SENTER]
+ instruction had put them in and place them into a wait-for-SIPI state.
+ - Because the processors will not respond to an INIT or SIPI when in the
+ TXT environment, it is necessary to create a small VT-x guest for the
+ APs. When they run in this guest, they will simply wait for the
+ INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence, which will cause VMEXITs, and then disable VT
+ and jump to the SIPI vector. This approach seemed like a better choice
+ than having to insert special code into the kernel's MP wakeup sequence.
+o Tboot then applies an (optional) user-defined launch policy to verify the
+ kernel and initrd.
+ - This policy is rooted in TPM NV and is described in the tboot project.
+ The tboot project also contains code for tools to create and provision
+ the policy.
+ - Policies are completely under user control and if not present then any
+ kernel will be launched.
+ - Policy action is flexible and can include halting on failures or simply
+ logging them and continuing.
+o Tboot adjusts the e820 table provided by the bootloader to reserve its own
+ location in memory as well as to reserve certain other TXT-related regions.
+o As part of it's launch, tboot DMA protects all of RAM (using the VT-d PMRs).
+ Thus, the kernel must be booted with 'intel_iommu=on' in order to remove
+ this blanket protection and use VT-d's page-level protection.
+o Tboot will populate a shared page with some data about itself and pass this
+ to the Linux kernel as it transfers control.
+ - The location of the shared page is passed via the boot_params struct as
+ a physical address.
+o The kernel will look for the tboot shared page address and, if it exists,
+ map it.
+o As one of the checks/protections provided by TXT, it makes a copy of the
+ VT-d DMARs in a DMA-protected region of memory and verifies them for
+ correctness. The VT-d code will detect if the kernel was launched with
+ tboot and use this copy instead of the one in the ACPI table.
+o At this point, tboot and TXT are out of the picture until a shutdown (S<n>)
+o In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT launch,
+ TXT must first be exited. This is to prevent attacks that attempt to crash
+ the system to gain control on reboot and steal data left in memory.
+ - The kernel will perform all of its sleep preparation and populate the
+ shared page with the ACPI data needed to put the platform in the desired
+ sleep state.
+ - Then the kernel jumps into tboot via the vector specified in the shared
+ page.
+ - Tboot will clean up the environment and disable TXT, then use the
+ kernel-provided ACPI information to actually place the platform into the
+ desired sleep state.
+ - In the case of S3, tboot will also register itself as the resume vector.
+ This is necessary because it must re-establish the measured environment
+ upon resume. Once the TXT environment has been restored, it will
+ restore the TPM PCRs and then transfer control back to the kernel's S3
+ resume vector.
+ In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel provides
+ tboot with a set of memory ranges (kernel code/data/bss, S3 resume code,
+ and AP trampoline) that tboot will calculate a MAC (message
+ authentication code) over and then seal with the TPM. On resume and
+ once the measured environment has been re-established, tboot will
+ re-calculate the MAC and verify it against the sealed value. Tboot's
+ policy determines what happens if the verification fails.
+
+That's pretty much it for TXT support.
+
+
+Configuring the System:
+======================
+
+This code works with 32bit, 32bit PAE, and 64bit (x86_64) kernels.
+
+In BIOS, the user must enable: TPM, TXT, VT-x, VT-d. Not all BIOSes allow
+these to be individually enabled/disabled and the screens in which to find
+them are BIOS-specific.
+
+grub.conf needs to be modified as follows:
+ title Linux 2.6.29-tip w/ tboot
+ root (hd0,0)
+ kernel /tboot.gz logging=serial,vga,memory
+ module /vmlinuz-2.6.29-tip intel_iommu=on ro root=LABEL=/ rhgb console=ttyS0,115200 3
+ module /initrd-2.6.29-tip.img
+ module /Q35_SINIT_17.BIN
+
+The kernel option for enabling Intel TXT support is found under the Security
+top-level menu and is called "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution
+Technology (TXT)". It is marked as EXPERIMENTAL and depends on the
+generic x86 support (to allow maximum flexibility in kernel build options),
+since the tboot code will detect whether the platform actually supports
+Intel TXT and thus whether any of the kernel code is executed.
+
+The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code
+Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on
+the Trusted Boot site. It is an (unencrypted) module signed by Intel that is
+used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system. It is
+signed because it operates at a higher privilege level in the system than any
+other macrocode and its correct operation is critical to the establishment of
+the DRTM. The process for determining the correct SINIT ACM for a system is
+documented in the SINIT-guide.txt file that is on the tboot SourceForge site
+under the SINIT ACM downloads.
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
000/040 ALL screen_info Text mode or frame buffer information
(struct screen_info)
040/014 ALL apm_bios_info APM BIOS information (struct apm_bios_info)
+058/008 ALL tboot_shared_addr Physical address of tboot shared page
060/010 ALL ist_info Intel SpeedStep (IST) BIOS support information
(struct ist_info)
080/010 ALL hd0_info hd0 disk parameter, OBSOLETE!!
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/acpi/acpica/hwsleep.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/acpi/acpica/hwsleep.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/acpi/acpica/hwsleep.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/acpi/acpica/hwsleep.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <acpi/acpi.h>
#include "accommon.h"
#include "actables.h"
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#define _COMPONENT ACPI_HARDWARE
ACPI_MODULE_NAME("hwsleep")
@@ -342,6 +343,38 @@ acpi_status asmlinkage acpi_enter_sleep_
ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE();
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT
+#define TB_COPY_GAS(tbg, g) \
+ tbg.space_id = g.space_id; \
+ tbg.bit_width = g.bit_width; \
+ tbg.bit_offset = g.bit_offset; \
+ tbg.access_width = g.access_width; \
+ tbg.address = g.address;
+
+ if (tboot_in_measured_env()) {
+ TB_COPY_GAS(tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_cnt_blk,
+ acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1a_control_block);
+ TB_COPY_GAS(tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_cnt_blk,
+ acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1b_control_block);
+ TB_COPY_GAS(tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_evt_blk,
+ acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1a_event_block);
+ TB_COPY_GAS(tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_evt_blk,
+ acpi_gbl_FADT.xpm1b_event_block);
+ tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1a_cnt_val = pm1a_control;
+ tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.pm1b_cnt_val = pm1b_control;
+ /* we need phys addr of waking vector, but can't use
+ virt_to_phys() on &acpi_gbl_FACS because it is ioremap'ed,
+ so calc from FACS phys addr */
+ tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.wakeup_vector = acpi_gbl_FADT.facs +
+ offsetof(struct acpi_table_facs, firmware_waking_vector);
+ tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.vector_width = 32;
+ tboot_shared->acpi_sinfo.kernel_s3_resume_vector =
+ acpi_wakeup_address;
+
+ tboot_sleep(sleep_state);
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Write #2: Write both SLP_TYP + SLP_EN */
status = acpi_hw_write_pm1_control(pm1a_control, pm1b_control);
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/pci/dmar.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/pci/dmar.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/pci/dmar.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/pci/dmar.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#undef PREFIX
#define PREFIX "DMAR:"
@@ -329,6 +330,11 @@ parse_dmar_table(void)
*/
dmar_table_detect();
+ /* ACPI tables may not be DMA protected by tboot, so use DMAR copy */
+ /* SINIT saved in SinitMleData in TXT heap (which is DMA protected) */
+ if (tboot_in_measured_env())
+ dmar_tbl = tboot_get_dmar_table();
+
dmar = (struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl;
if (!dmar)
return -ENODEV;
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/drivers/pci/intel-iommu.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/intel-iommu.h>
#include <linux/sysdev.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include "pci.h"
@@ -2775,12 +2776,31 @@ static int __init init_iommu_sysfs(void)
int __init intel_iommu_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
+ int force_on = 0;
- if (dmar_table_init())
+ /* VT-d is required for a TXT/tboot launch, so enforce that */
+ if (tboot_in_measured_env()) {
+ if (no_iommu || swiotlb || dmar_disabled)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: Forcing Intel-IOMMU to enabled\n");
+ dmar_disabled = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB
+ swiotlb = 0;
+#endif
+ no_iommu = 0;
+ force_on = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (dmar_table_init()) {
+ if (force_on)
+ panic("TXT: Failed to initialize DMAR table\n");
return -ENODEV;
+ }
- if (dmar_dev_scope_init())
+ if (dmar_dev_scope_init()) {
+ if (force_on)
+ panic("TXT: Failed to initialize DMAR device scope\n");
return -ENODEV;
+ }
/*
* Check the need for DMA-remapping initialization now.
@@ -2796,6 +2816,8 @@ int __init intel_iommu_init(void)
ret = init_dmars();
if (ret) {
+ if (force_on)
+ panic("TXT: Failed to initialize DMARs\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "IOMMU: dmar init failed\n");
put_iova_domain(&reserved_iova_list);
iommu_exit_mempool();
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/init/main.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/init/main.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/init/main.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/init/main.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <trace/kmemtrace.h>
@@ -696,6 +697,8 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void
ftrace_init();
+ tboot_create_trampoline();
+
/* Do the rest non-__init'ed, we're now alive */
rest_init();
}
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/kernel/cpu.c linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/kernel/cpu.c
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/kernel/cpu.c 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/kernel/cpu.c 2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <asm/tboot.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/* Serializes the updates to cpu_online_mask, cpu_present_mask */
@@ -379,7 +380,7 @@ static cpumask_var_t frozen_cpus;
int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
{
- int cpu, first_cpu, error;
+ int cpu, first_cpu, error, num_cpus = 0;
error = stop_machine_create();
if (error)
@@ -394,6 +395,7 @@ int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
if (cpu == first_cpu)
continue;
+ num_cpus++;
error = _cpu_down(cpu, 1);
if (!error) {
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, frozen_cpus);
@@ -404,6 +406,8 @@ int disable_nonboot_cpus(void)
break;
}
}
+ /* ensure all CPUs have gone into wait-for-SIPI */
+ tboot_wait_for_aps(num_cpus);
if (!error) {
BUG_ON(num_online_cpus() > 1);
/* Make sure the CPUs won't be enabled by someone else */
diff -uprN linux-2.6.30-rc4/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/security/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.30-rc4/security/Kconfig 2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/security/Kconfig 2009-05-07 08:32:07.000000000 -0700
@@ -133,6 +133,28 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
+config INTEL_TXT
+ bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+ depends on EXPERIMENTAL && X86 && DMAR
+ help
+ This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+ Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+ Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+ of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+ will have no effect.
+
+ Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of sysem configuration and
+ initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
+ create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification.
+
+ See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+ about Intel(R) TXT.
+ See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+ See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
+ Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
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