[PATCH 37/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon

From: David Howells
Date: Wed Aug 27 2008 - 09:57:40 EST


Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@xxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-nfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---

fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 +++---
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)


diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index e3e37f7..34d2ade 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ nfsd_create_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *resfhp,
* send along the gid on create when it tries to implement
* setgid directories via NFS:
*/
- if (current->fsuid != 0)
+ if (current_fsuid() != 0)
iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID);
if (iap->ia_valid)
return nfsd_setattr(rqstp, resfhp, iap, 0, (time_t)0);
@@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
IS_APPEND(inode)? " append" : "",
__mnt_is_readonly(exp->ex_path.mnt)? " ro" : "");
dprintk(" owner %d/%d user %d/%d\n",
- inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->fsuid, current->fsgid);
+ inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid());
#endif

/* Normally we reject any write/sattr etc access on a read-only file
@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
* with NFSv3.
*/
if ((acc & NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE) &&
- inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
+ inode->i_uid == current_fsuid())
return 0;

/* This assumes NFSD_MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} == MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} */

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