Re: Really good idea to allow mmap(0, FIXED)?

[David Wagner]

Arjan van de Ven  wrote:
>> Let me see if I understand.  If the kernel does this somewhere:
>> 
>>     struct s *foo;
>>     foo->x->y = 0;
>> 
>> and if there is some way that userland code can cause this to be
>> executed with 'foo' set to a NULL pointer, then user-land code can
>> do this:
>> 
>>     mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE,
>>         MAP_FIXED|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
>>     struct s *bar = 0;
>
>the question isn't if it's a good idea to allow mmap(0) but to allow
>mmap PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC !

Oops.  Please ignore the PROT_EXEC.  That is completely irrelevant.
I'm sorry I included it; the inclusion of PROT_EXEC was a mistake.
Delete PROT_EXEC, then re-read my email -- everything else in there is
still valid.

The security exploit I explained didn't involve executing anything
from the mmap'ed page; the kernel reads an address from this page,
and then dereferences it.  Even without PROT_EXEC, it sounds like a
user-triggerable NULL pointer dereference in the kernel can create a
local root exploit (at least in some cases).
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