Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx (Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx):
> On Wed, 19 Apr 2006 02:40:25 EDT, Kyle Moffett said:
> > Perhaps the SELinux model should be extended to handle (dir-inode,
> > path-entry) pairs.  For example, if I want to protect the /etc/shadow
> > file regardless of what tool is used to safely modify it, I would set
> 
> Some of us think that the tools can protect /etc/shadow just fine on their
> own, and are concerned with rogue software that abuses /etc/shadow without
> bothering to safely modify it..

Can you rephrase this?  I'm don't understand what you're saying...

My default response would have to be:

> own, and are concerned with rogue software that abuses /etc/shadow without
> bothering to safely modify it..

rogue software like vi?

thanks,
-serge
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