[RFC 2.6.10 11/22] AH, ESP: Add offloading of inbound packets

From: David Dillow
Date: Thu Dec 30 2004 - 04:33:56 EST


# This is a BitKeeper generated diff -Nru style patch.
#
# ChangeSet
# 2004/12/30 00:47:54-05:00 dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
# Add crypto offload for inbound IPv4 AH xfrms.
#
# Signed-off-by: David Dillow <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
#
# net/ipv4/esp4.c
# 2004/12/30 00:47:36-05:00 dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx +30 -16
# Add crypto offload for inbound IPv4 AH xfrms.
#
# Signed-off-by: David Dillow <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
#
# net/ipv4/ah4.c
# 2004/12/30 00:47:36-05:00 dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx +13 -4
# Add crypto offload for inbound IPv4 AH xfrms.
#
# Signed-off-by: David Dillow <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
#
diff -Nru a/net/ipv4/ah4.c b/net/ipv4/ah4.c
--- a/net/ipv4/ah4.c 2004-12-30 01:10:02 -05:00
+++ b/net/ipv4/ah4.c 2004-12-30 01:10:02 -05:00
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_auth_hdr *ah;
struct ah_data *ahp;
+ int offload;
char work_buf[60];

if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_auth_hdr)))
@@ -164,6 +165,7 @@

ah = (struct ip_auth_hdr*)skb->data;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ offload = skb_pop_xfrm_result(skb);

memcpy(work_buf, iph, iph->ihl*4);

@@ -181,10 +183,17 @@

memcpy(auth_data, ah->auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len);
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb->nh.raw);
- ahp->icv(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
- if (memcmp(ah->auth_data, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
- x->stats.integrity_failed++;
- goto out;
+ if (offload & XFRM_OFFLOAD_AUTH) {
+ if (unlikely(offload & XFRM_OFFLOAD_AUTH_FAIL)) {
+ x->stats.integrity_failed++;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ahp->icv(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
+ if (memcmp(ah->auth_data, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
+ x->stats.integrity_failed++;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
}
((struct iphdr*)work_buf)->protocol = ah->nexthdr;
diff -Nru a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c 2004-12-30 01:10:02 -05:00
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c 2004-12-30 01:10:02 -05:00
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
int encap_len = 0;
+ int offload;

if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
@@ -171,22 +172,32 @@
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
goto out;

+ offload = skb_pop_xfrm_result(skb);
+
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
- u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
- u8 sum1[alen];
+ if (unlikely(offload & XFRM_OFFLOAD_AUTH_FAIL)) {
+ x->stats.integrity_failed++;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(offload & XFRM_OFFLOAD_AUTH)) {
+ u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
+ u8 sum1[alen];

- esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
+ esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);

- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
- BUG();
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
+ BUG();

- if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
- x->stats.integrity_failed++;
- goto out;
+ if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
+ x->stats.integrity_failed++;
+ goto out;
+ }
}
}

+ /* XXX I think this can be moved to the !offload case */
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;

@@ -195,15 +206,12 @@
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
iph = skb->nh.iph;

- /* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
- if (esp->conf.ivlen)
- crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
-
- {
- u8 nexthdr[2];
+ if (!(offload & XFRM_OFFLOAD_CONF)) {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
- u8 workbuf[60];
- int padlen;
+
+ /* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
+ if (esp->conf.ivlen)
+ crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));

if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -214,6 +222,12 @@
crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
+ }
+
+ {
+ u8 nexthdr[2];
+ u8 workbuf[60];
+ int padlen;

if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
-
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