[PATCH][RFC] invalid ELF binaries can execute - better sanity checking

From: Jesper Juhl
Date: Thu Jan 08 2004 - 21:26:56 EST



The current Linux kernel does only very basic sanity checking on ELF
binaries.
In my oppinion, any attempt to load an invalid/corrupted binary should
fail as early as possible. Currently Linux will assign a PID to a lot of
different variants of broken ELF binaries, so I took it upon myself to fix
that up a bit.

Why bother checking validity of a binary too closely?

Well, the reasons I can thing of include

- Correctness. If it's invalid it /should/ fail, and as early as possible.

- Stability. Who knows when it'll crash and what damage it may have
done before it crashes?

- Least amount of surprise for the user. If a binary has become corrupted
the user is likely to want to be told it's bad when loading it (if
possible), rather than being left wondering about strange crashes during
runtime.

- Security 1. Is it not plausible that someone may try to play tricks on
the kernel with invalid binaries? Isn't it safer just rejecting them if we
*know* they are bad?

- Security 2. If a virus/worm/trojan/whatever attempts to infect a binary
and does not do a perfect job of fixing up the ELF header, section table
headers etc, then with the current code we would in some cases still run
the binary. If we enforce as many sanity checks as possible such an
infected binary willlikely fail to run.


The patch below only implements two additional sanity checks, and they are
very weak. This code is not intended to be merged in its current form, I
only did it as proof that more valid sanity checks are possible (well, you
probably already knew that), and to prove that I /do/ have a basic
understanding of the ELF format.. well, consider it flame detergent, code
talks, BS walks - tends to be the norm on LKML ;)

The two checks I've implemented in this patch simply check that e_version
is not EV_NONE (Invalid version), and that e_ident[EI_CLASS] is not
ELFCLASSNONE (Invalid class). No binaries looking like that should ever
exist, so they are valid (albeit not very strong) sanity checks.


What I would like to know at this point is whether adding additional
checks to load_elf_binary() in binfmt_elf is worthwhile and desirable, or
if there's some (unknown to me) very good reason to only do the very basic
checks that are currently done?
If there's an interrest in seeing strong sanity checks done in ELF binary
loading, then I'll attempt to expand my patch to implement whatever sanity
checks the ELF spec allows for (and ofcourse re-do the checks below right
so they check for the exact valid value and reject anything else instead
of just test for a single 'known to be invalid' value).
Initially I'd be dealing with i386 only, as that's all I can actually test
with, but I can get access to x86-64 hardware as well and I would do my
very best to do this for all archs.

In order to test my current code I've done the following:

Test if it compiles without errors/warnings
- it does.

Test if a kernel with this patch applied boots and is able to run a basic
Linux distribution
- it boots and currently runs my Slackware 9.1 install just fine.

Create a minimal test program that is easily modifyable with a hex editor
to create test-case binaries that /should/ fail the sanity check.
- I've been using the minimal program below and it does fail if
modified to contain the 'tested for, invalid' header fields.


; Test program start - original code from
; http://www.muppetlabs.com/~breadbox/software/tiny/teensy.html

org 0x08048000

ehdr: ; Elf32_Ehdr
db 0x7F, "ELF", 1, 1, 1 ; e_ident
times 9 db 0
dw 2 ; e_type
dw 3 ; e_machine
dd 1 ; e_version
dd _start ; e_entry
dd phdr - $$ ; e_phoff
dd 0 ; e_shoff
dd 0 ; e_flags
dw ehdrsize ; e_ehsize
dw phdrsize ; e_phentsize
dw 1 ; e_phnum
dw 0 ; e_shentsize
dw 0 ; e_shnum
dw 0 ; e_shstrndx

ehdrsize equ $ - ehdr

phdr: ; Elf32_Phdr
dd 1 ; p_type
dd 0 ; p_offset
dd $$ ; p_vaddr
dd $$ ; p_paddr
dd filesize ; p_filesz
dd filesize ; p_memsz
dd 5 ; p_flags
dd 0x1000 ; p_align

phdrsize equ $ - phdr

_start:
xor bl, bl
xor eax, eax
inc eax
int 0x80

filesize equ $ - $$

; Test program end


Here's the patch I've created to implement the two additional, weak,
sanity checks - patch against 2.6.1-rc1-mm2 :


--- linux-2.6.1-rc1-mm2-orig/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2003-12-31 05:47:13.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.1-rc1-mm2/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2004-01-09 01:41:05.000000000 +0100
@@ -482,11 +482,14 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (memcmp(elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
-
+ if (elf_ex.e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASSNONE)
+ goto out;
if (elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC && elf_ex.e_type != ET_DYN)
goto out;
if (!elf_check_arch(&elf_ex))
goto out;
+ if (elf_ex.e_version == EV_NONE)
+ goto out;
if (!bprm->file->f_op||!bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;


Any and all comments are welcome - what do you think, should we have safer
binary loading in 2.6.x?


-- Jesper Juhl

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