Re: No more DoS

From: David S. Miller (davem@redhat.com)
Date: Thu Dec 21 2000 - 21:00:15 EST


   Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2000 13:24:44 +1100 (CST)
   From: Mike OConnor <kernel@pineview.net>

   I would like to point who ever is in charge of the TCP stack for
   the linux kernel at a site which claims to have a method of
   eliminate denial of service (DoS) attacks

   http://grc.com/r&d/nomoredos.htm

   With my limited unstanding of TCP and DoS attacks this would seem
   to be the answer, instead of a work around.

These people claim that no connection state needs to be saved for the
beginning of the negotiation, and I claim this is unworkable because
it ignores TCP timestamps entirely.

Furthermore, it also cannot work because it makes retransmissions
of the SYN/ACK very non-workable. I suppose his TCP stack just hacks
around this by just waiting for the original client SYN to get
retransmitted or something like this. I question whether that can
even work reliably.

I think not holding onto any state for an incoming SYN is nothing but
a dream in any serious modern TCP implementation. It can be reduced,
but not eliminated. The former is what most modern stacks have done
to fight these problems.

Later,
David S. Miller
davem@redhat.com
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